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Abstract 
 
System safety is primarily concerned with epistemic questions, that is, questions concerning knowledge and the 
degree of confidence that can be placed in that knowledge.  For systems with which human experience is long, such 
as roads, bridges, and mechanical devices, knowledge about what is required to make the systems safe is deep and 
detailed. High confidence can be placed in the validity of that knowledge.  For other systems, however, with which 
human experience is comparatively short, such as those that rely in part or in whole on software, knowledge about 
what is required to ensure safety tends to be shallow and general.  The confidence that can be placed in the validity 
of that knowledge is consequently low.   In a previous paper, we enumerated a collection of foundational epistemic 
questions concerning software system safety.  In this paper, we review and refine the questions, discuss some 
difficulties that attend to answering the questions today, and speculate on possible research to improve the situation. 
 
Introduction 
 
On first thought, one might be hard pressed to think of two disciplines less alike than philosophy and engineering.  
Philosophy is concerned with grand, abstract, big picture questions. Why is there something rather than nothing? 
What is real? What is truth, and how do we know when we have found it?  Engineering is concerned with ordinary, 
practical, detailed questions.  How much weight can the bridge hold?   Does this particular wing design provide 
enough lift?  How can we build a stronger, more effective, cheaper mousetrap?  This first thought is probably correct 
for some aspects of philosophy; but for at least one—epistemology—it is quite wrong. 
 
Epistemology is one of the major branches of study in philosophy (Clark, 1989); it is concerned with searching for 
answers to questions such as, ‘What do we know,’ and ‘How do we know we know what we know?’ (McCarthy, 
2008).   Although abstract questions such as these may have little direct relevance to engineering, concrete versions 
of such questions are not only relevant, but essential. 
 
Consider, for example: What do we know about the safety of this automated control system?   How do we know that 
what we think we know about its safety is accurate?   These are critical engineering questions; for system safety 
professionals, they are probably the most important questions.  They are also questions about epistemology (that is, 
epistemic questions). 
 
In a previous paper (Holloway & Johnson, 2009), we identified an initial collection of fundamental epistemic 
questions about software system safety.  In this paper, we explain necessary context and definitions, present a 
refinement of the previously developed questions, discuss some difficulties that exist in answering the questions 
today, and speculate on possible research that may enable improved confidence in the accuracy of answers to the 
questions. 
 
Motivation & Definitions 
 
Consider two questions a system safety engineer may ask about a particular system:  'Is the system safe?'   'Do I 
know the system is safe?'  In an ideal world for any specific system, the answer to the first question is the same as 
the answer to the second.  That is, if we know the system is safe, then it is safe; and if we do not know the system is 
safe, then it is not safe.  But the real world is not an ideal world. In the real world the answers to the two questions 
may differ. We may know a system is safe when it is not, and we may ‘know’ a system is not safe when it is. 
 
The potential difference in the answers to the two questions is especially apparent today in software-intensive 
systems.  While many software safety experts lament the lack of adequate means for assessing the safety of software 
systems, denounce existing software standards as based on weak or non-existent foundations, and warn against 
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increasing reliance on automated systems, the actual safety record of software-based systems has been exceptionally 
good to date.   So good in fact, that a strong case can be made, at least for commercial aviation, that no technology 
yet introduced has had a more positive effect on safety than has software.  On the other hand, despite the excellent 
safety record to date, the arguments about future dangers seem quite persuasive, particularly as systems become 
increasingly complex, and more and more authority is given to automated systems to perform safety-critical 
functions.  
 
Trying to understand why this discrepancy exists between current practice and theory provided the initial motivation 
for exploring epistemic questions.   The definitions that follow provide the context for understanding the results of 
this exploration so far. 
Definitions Concerning Knowledge: Epistemic is an adjective meaning ‘of or relating to knowledge or degree of 
acceptance’ (Oxford University Press,  1989).   Epistemology is a noun defined as ‘the theory or science of the 
method or grounds of knowledge’ (Oxford University Press,  1989).  Epistemology is one of the major branches of 
study in philosophy (Clark, 1989); it is concerned with searching for answers to questions such as, ‘What is 
knowledge,’ and ‘How is knowledge acquired?’ 
The verbs believe, think, and know, which are used in relation to knowledge, all have multiple shades of meaning, 
and tend to be used somewhat differently by different people.  One person may use the three verbs almost 
interchangeably.  For such a person, these three questions are essentially identical: Do I believe the system is safe?  
Do I think the system is safe?  Do I know the system is safe?   
 
Another person may use the three words to express graduated levels of confidence.  For such a person, the three 
questions are quite different; answering them affirmatively requires different levels of personal certainty in the 
safety of the system. For example, believe may correspond to ‘more likely than not’, think to ‘very likely’, and know 
to ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ (or perhaps to even a stronger standard). For the purposes of this paper, we adopt this 
level-of-confidence based approach1.   
 
Regardless of how a particular individual uses the three verbs, he or she may be wrong. For example, Jill may 
believe, think, or know that the 28th International System Safety Conference is being held in Yorktown, Virginia, in 
October 2010.  The strength of Jill’s level of confidence does not change the fact that she is simply wrong (Bahnsen, 
1978; Damar, 2005; Grudy 2005). 
Definitions Concerning Safety:  The noun safety can be defined absolutely as ‘freedom from accidents or losses’ 
(Leveson, 1995), with the adjective safe thus similarly meaning ‘free from accidents or losses.’  Such definitions are 
recognized to be ideals, which are not fully achievable in practice.  No system can be truly said to be absolutely and 
forever free from accidents or losses.  So, in practice the words tend to be used relativistically.  Commercial air 
travel is said to be safe, for example.  This attribution of safety does not mean that no accidents or losses ever occur 
in commercial air travel, but that accidents and losses occur with sufficient rarity as to be considered acceptable. 
Understanding the practical definition of safety thus requires understanding the meaning of acceptable. What degree 
of freedom from accidents and losses is acceptable?  Answers to that question have varied over time, among 
different domains, among different regions of the world, and even among different individuals (Leveson, 1994; 
Petroski, 1992; Wilde, 2001).   
 
In the context of system safety, these variations may be subsumed by an operational definition of acceptability for 
each system. For commercial air travel, the acceptability of its current level of freedom from accidents and losses is 
seen in the combination of the facts that users continue to fly, engineers and companies continue to produce aircraft 
and other components necessary for air travel, regulatory bodies continue to produce regulations for air travel, and 
governments continue to allow air travel within their boundaries.  No single one of these facts taken alone 
necessarily implies acceptable safety, but taken together they do. 
 
                                                          
1 Although we know that any philosopher reading this paper will consider this section simplistic and incomplete, we believe that 
it is sufficiently detailed and complete for the intended audience.  The strength of this belief is higher for the current paper than it 
was for the previous one, based on comments from philosophers and non-philosophers on a similar section in the first paper. 
Based on the above definitions, the first question that opened this section (‘Is the system safe?’) may be understood 
to be equivalent to ‘Is the system acceptably free from accidents and losses?’  Adopting the confidence-level-based 
definitions for believe, think, and know, and assuming that for safety-critical systems, the highest level of 
confidence is required, the second question (‘Do we know the system is safe?’) means ‘Do we have confidence at 
least beyond a reasonable doubt that the system is acceptably free from accidents and losses?’   
 
The remainder of the paper concerns this latter question.  For simplicity of expression, we often revert to the shorter 
form, relying on the reader to mentally translate to the longer form. 
 
Foundational Epistemic Questions 
 
For any system upon which lives depend, the system should not only be safe, but the designers, operators, users, and 
regulators of the system should also know that it is safe.   For software-intensive systems, a consensus does not exist 
on what is necessary to constitute knowledge. Theorists and practitioners have long quarreled with each other and 
among themselves over the issue. The wide range of existing opinions, and the emotional fervor with which these 
opinions are held (Safety Critical Mailing List Archive, 2010), suggests that reaching a consensus is not soon likely. 
 
Perhaps one of the reasons for the lack of consensus is that the community is trying to answer the broad questions, 
without first refining those questions into more foundational questions.  Such a situation is analogous to a jury in a 
criminal trial trying to answer the ultimate question, ‘Is the defendant guilty,’ without first answering questions 
whose answers provide evidence upon which to base the ultimate answer.  Questions such as, ‘Was the defendant 
present at the scene of the crime’, ‘Did the defendant have the means to commit the crime’, and ‘Could someone be 
trying to frame the defendant?’ 
 
In creating our initial list of foundational questions for software system safety, we considered two main categories: 
existing systems, and future (yet-to-be-built) systems.   We continue to believe that these are appropriate top-level 
categories; each is discussed below, with additional sub-categories identified, and specific questions listed.   The 
format used for listing the questions is to number them sequentially, give a short form of the question, discuss what 
the question means (with perhaps additional related questions), and mention some of the difficulties involved in 
answering it.  Where appropriate, we also discuss potential areas for fruitful research. 
 
Questions About Existing Systems: In the original paper, we distinguished between two categories of existing 
systems: systems that have been operating for sufficiently long that they are ‘known’ to be safe, and systems that 
have not been operating that long.   Because all but a couple of epistemic questions are similar for both of these 
categories, we no longer consider that particular distinction to be important.   Instead we divide the questions into 
those that are independent of whether an accident or loss has occurred and those that are specific to gaining 
knowledge after an accident or loss has occurred. 
 
Accident-independent questions:  There are at least six2 foundational epistemic questions that can be asked about all 
existing systems. 
 
(1)  How is operational safety assessed?  This question is intended to determine, for each specific system, the 
method or methods used to decide that the system is acceptably free from accidents and incidents as it is used. 
Related questions include the following.  What is necessary for a system to be considered to have its safety 
effectively demonstrated?  What information must be collected and analyzed to provide adequate confidence in the 
continuing accuracy of a safety assessment?  For how long must this information be collected and analyzed?   
 
Answering these questions is complicated by the difficulty of gathering accurate operational data in many industries. 
Without access to such data, knowing how close an outwardly safe system may be to having an accident is difficult. 
A system may appear to be functioning in a fully safe and successful manner for a long period of time, but it may in 
fact be only a few small steps away from a major accident (Johnson, Herd, Wolff, 2010).   Improving operational 
data collection will involve not only research into non-obtrusive (to both humans and machines) means of collection, 
but also resolution of various ethical and legal issues that arise. 
                                                          
2 The original paper also listed six; however, we have combined two very similar questions from the original list, and moved one 
question to this section from another section. 
 
(2)  How does operational safety compare with expected safety?  This question is intended to help safety engineers 
and others determine whether the pre-deployment predictions of the expected safety of a particular system 
adequately predict the actual safety of that system once it is deployed.   Consistently asking and answering the 
question might result in a better understanding of the efficacy of system safety procedures and tools.  It might also 
prevent some accidents and losses from happening, because history shows that accidents sometimes occur after a 
period in which the operational performance of a particular system has deviated from its expected performance in 
ways that were not realized at the time (Haddon-Cave, 2009; Snook, 2000; Vaughan, 1996).  Answering the 
question is not an easy task, however, for the reasons just discussed above. 
 
(3)  How should difference in safety assessments be reconciled?  For example, consider a software-intensive medical 
device, which is considered safe by the appropriate regulatory authority, but which has occasionally failed in such a 
way as to lead to successful lawsuits against its manufacturer.  What should be done in this case?  What evidence is 
needed to permit an informed decision to be made by the regulatory authority?  From one perspective, the argument 
can be made that the existence of a flaw increases the likelihood of other undiscovered safety-reducing problems, 
and thus the device should be removed from the market.  From another perspective, the argument can also be made 
that the discovery and rectification of the flaw increase confidence that the device will never fail in that way again.  
 
(4) How does the operational environment affect safety?  This question is particularly relevant for systems that come 
to be used in environments different from those anticipated when the systems were originally designed.  Asking and 
trying to answer the question will help improve assessments of the potential safety consequences of changes in the 
operational environment.  Answering the question can be difficult because it can be very hard to identify all of the 
myriad specific changes in an operational environment that should legitimately affect confidence in the safety of the 
system.  Research into better methods and tools for identifying safety-relevant environmental factors seems 
potentially fruitful. 
 
(5) What maintenance is required for safety?  Any system involving components that can degrade over time requires 
maintenance to ensure that such components are replaced or repaired before their degradation negatively affects 
system safety.  The extent, frequency, and criticality of this maintenance needs to be well understood, as does the 
means for ensuring that required maintenance is performed properly and on time.  Because maintenance is also 
known to be a factor in causing accidents, maintaining a system may both bolster and undermine confidence in 
safety.   
 
(6) How do changes affect safety?  Once in operation, few systems remain unchanged.  Whether in response to 
accidents (as discussed in the next section), or to modify or extend functionality, changes are common, particularly 
for software-intensive systems where making changes appear to be deceptively simple.  When changes are made to 
an operational system, those changes should not adversely affect the safety of the system.  Ensuring this is the case 
requires asking the appropriate question and determining the level of confidence required in the answer to it.  
Because software is increasingly being used to tailor or configure complex systems in a variety of industries, 
operating profiles for a system may be subject to almost daily changes.  In situations such as these, determining the 
effect that a change should have in confidence of safety can be very difficult; the magnitude or extent of a change 
may or may not have proportionate impact on knowledge of the safety of a such a complex system.  Research in 
change-impact analysis is needed to help answer this epistemic question with more confidence than is possible now. 
 
Accident-related questions:  As mentioned earlier, and as any system safety professional understands, no system is 
perfectly safe.  So for almost any real system, an accident3 will eventually occur.  When this happens, there are at 
least three4 epistemic questions that should be asked and answered. 
 
(7) What information is available to investigators?  The likelihood that an accident or incident investigation will be 
able to determine what happened is strongly related to the quantity and quality of the information available to them. 
Over time engineers and investigators have come to have a good understanding of the sorts of information needed 
for traditional systems and components.  The situation is different for software-intensive systems, where a consensus 
                                                          
3 We use ‘accident’ as a shorthand.  Consider it to include accidents, incidents, and other undesirable outcomes for which 
investigations are conducted. 
4 The original paper listed six.  Question (8) discussed here was divided into four separate, but closely related questions. 
about the necessary information has yet to be reached.  An expanded version of the fundamental question is as 
follows:  What information about the system and its state at the time of the accident must be available to 
investigators to enable them to gain sufficient knowledge to be able to conduct a thorough investigation?  A related 
question is What do investigators do if adequate information is not available? See (Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 2000) 
for example of a situation in which investigators had to make do with inadequate information. 
 
Answering this question can be complicated by the extensive fault-tolerance mechanisms used in many advanced 
systems.  Software or hardware errors may be caught and effectively handled by such mechanisms, which can help 
raise legitimate confidence in safety.  However, these mechanisms can also mask the source of some types of 
failures from system operators, which may make recovering from those failures more difficult than it otherwise 
would be (Johnson & Holloway, 2007).  Regardless of whether system operators have access to all the failure 
information, accident investigators must have access to the information so that they are able to identify the true 
factors leading to certain accidents (Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 2007). 
 
(8) How do investigators know all relevant factors have been found? The subject of causality is one of strong 
interest, both theoretically (Collins, Hall, and Paul, 2004) and practically (Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 
2008).  For the purposes of improving safety of the particular system involved in the accident and of related or 
potential future systems, investigators need to identify all the factors that contributed to making the accident happen, 
and they need to have a high level of confidence that they have done so.  As systems become more complex, and 
more reliance is placed on software systems with which little previous experience exists, this task becomes more 
difficult, and confidence that it has been completed subsequently lower. 
 
(9) How can lessons taught by an accident improve safety?  Identifying causes alone is unlikely to improve safety.  
This information must be used to develop improvements to prevent these causes from leading to another accident, 
not only in the particular system investigated, but in similar systems, either currently operating or ones to be 
developed in the future.  These improvements must be implemented, and the knowledge that led to their creation 
must be made available in an understandable form for as long as it is relevant.  Also, designers and engineers of 
future systems not only need to have access to the lessons taught by previous accidents, they must also have the 
motivation to seek out and use this information.  Too often designers and engineers seem not to read full accident 
reports, but instead rely on word of mouth, which may convey partial and biased views about the causes of previous 
accidents (Holloway & Johnson, 2006). 
 
These three questions, and possible ways to answer them, have been considered in various ways—see for example 
(Collins, Hall, and Paul, 2004; Greenwell, 2007; Holloway, 1999; Johnson, 1997; Johnson, 2003; Leveson, 1994; 
Leveson, 1995; Petroski, 1992; Petroski 1994)—but we are unaware of any systematic, detailed research efforts 
aimed towards developing methods for providing cogent, comprehensive answers to all of them.  The creation and 
successful execution of such a research program could make a very important, potentially life-saving contribution to 
system safety world-wide. 
 
Questions About Future Systems: As difficult to answer as questions about existing systems may be, the 
foundational epistemic questions about systems that have not yet been fielded may be even more difficult to answer.  
These future systems can be divided into two main categories: systems that are intended to replace existing 
operational systems; and systems that are truly new.  The two categories share some epistemic questions, and have 
some unique ones also.  We discuss the questions unique to replacement systems first, then those unique to truly 
new systems, and conclude with those common to both categories of systems. 
 
Replacement system questions:  A common type of new system is one that is intended to replace a system that is 
already in place.  Many different reasons may exist for creating such a replacement system, ranging from 
introducing software systems where there were none previously (as has been done, for example, in aircraft with the 
introduction of fly-by-wire flight controls), to upgrading the capabilities of an existing software system (for 
example, modernization of various air traffic management systems).   Regardless of the motivation for the 
replacement, at least two5 epistemic questions should be asked. 
 
                                                          
5 Reduced from four in the original work. 
(10) What does ‘at least as safe as’ mean?  The most common safety requirement imposed on a replacement system 
is that it be at least as safe as the system it is replacing.  Such a requirement seems quite reasonable in theory, but in 
practice determining what it means may be difficult.   Part of that determination is likely to involve asking epistemic 
questions (1) – (6) about the system to be replaced, and then deciding how the answers to those questions will be 
used to establish specific safety requirements for the new system.  For replacement systems that are intended to 
provide additional safety (for example, anti-lock braking systems), similar questions must be asked and answered. 
 
(11) What are the safety implications during transition?  Putting a replacement system into operation requires some 
form of transition from the old system to the new one.  In some cases this transition might be done immediately, but 
in most cases, a period of time will be required in which both the old and new systems are operating.  Regardless of 
the transition time required for putting the replacement system in place, there will necessarily be some time required 
for the operators to adjust to using the new system.  Understanding the safety of this situation is essential; otherwise, 
the possibility exists that the risk of accidents during transition may be unacceptably high.  Research to develop 
methods and tools to reason about transition effects could make an important contribution to system safety. 
 
New system questions:  At least three epistemic questions are important to answer when developing a truly new 
system. 
 
(12) How is the desired level of safety to be determined?  All of the questions mentioned above about existing 
systems presuppose that a determination has already been made about the level of safety that the system is intended 
to provide.  Determining that level is an essential activity in creating a new system; however,, it is rarely a simple 
task.  Because creating meaningful measures for the absence of something (in this case, unacceptable accidents or 
losses) is so difficult, proxies for the level of safety are often used instead.  Perhaps the most common such proxy 
involves establishing a permitted probability of failure. 
 
(13) What can be learned from existing systems?  Even when a new system is not replacing an existing one, its 
intended functions and use may share some characteristics with existing ones.  The knowledge available about any 
such systems, particularly the knowledge derived from answers to questions (1) – (9), may be important. 
 
(14) How will novel technologies affect safety?   If any novel technologies will be used in the system, then the effect 
these technologies may have on safety must be carefully considered.  This consideration should include not only the 
potential direct effects, but also indirect effects, such as how resource matters related to novel technologies may 
affect the resources available for safety assessment and assurance.  Answering the question is complicated by the 
difficulty of maintaining an accurate knowledge of the impact on safety when operators and users continually adopt 
to the introduction of new technologies in ways that may not have been anticipated. For example, the introduction of 
anti-lock braking systems seems to have led to at least some drivers to increase their speeds, rather than continue to 
drive at the speeds they did before their vehicles had the system, under the belief that the braking system will enable 
them to stop safely at the faster speeds. Theories of risk homeostasis attempt to explain this behavior (Wilde, 2001), 
but knowing how to apply those theories in the safety analysis of a specific system is difficult.  Research in this area, 
along with research specific to the novel technologies themselves (for example, research about safety analysis 
methods for non-deterministic, cooperating, autonomous systems), is needed to improve our ability to answer this 
epistemic question. 
 
In considering answers to questions (13) and (14), it is important to recognize that novelty can sometimes be 
disguised as simple extensions of existing approaches. ‘The history of engineering is full of examples of dramatic 
failures that were once considered confident extrapolations of successful designs’ (Petroski, 1994). 
 
Common questions:  Many important epistemic questions about future systems are common, whether the system 
replaces an existing one, or is a truly new one.  There are at least seven6 such questions. 
 
(15) What level of confidence in safety is required?  Once the desired level of safety is determined, the level of 
confidence that this safety will be achieved must be determined.  That is, how certain must the system developers 
(and regulators if the system being developed requires regulation) be that the system is safe?  Complete certainty is 
not possible.  Perhaps a level of confidence analogous to the legal standard ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ may be 
                                                          
6 The original list had ten; we moved one of them to the ‘accident-independent questions’ section, and combined four into two. 
appropriate (Caseley and White, 2009).  If not, some other level must be determined.  Answering this question may 
complicated by several factors: disagreements among developers and regulators about what is required; unwarranted 
confidence on the part of some about the level of safety that can be legitimately achieved; and possible lack of solid 
evidence in which to establish a confidence level. 
 
(16) How is knowledge obtained about the intended operational environment?  For any new system, understanding 
the environment in which it will be used is necessary for determining safety requirements.  The difficulty of 
obtaining the needed knowledge may range from fairly simple to quite hard depending on the specific system.  For 
example, in healthcare, there are clear ethical issues in testing out new devices or procedures on patients, but without 
such tests the knowledge of the actual operational environment may be limited.  For space applications, reproducing 
the rigors of the eventual operating environment prior to launch is extremely difficult, if not impossible. 
 
(17) How is the sufficiency of safety requirements assured?  Requirements validation—determining that the 
requirements completely specify the desired attributes of a system—is well-known to be exceedingly difficult in 
general. Safety requirements validation is no exception, and because of the potential consequences of incomplete 
safety requirements, accomplishing it is critical.  System developers (and regulators in domains in which regulators 
play a part) must know, to a sufficient level of confidence, that the requirements developed for the system are 
sufficient to ensure the necessary level of safety within the intended operational environment of the system. If this is 
not the case, then there is a danger that subsequent verification will fail to test or analyze satisfaction of 
requirements that are must be satisfied during eventual operation.  Requirements validation research has long been 
an active area, and will continue to be until methods and tools are developed in which high confidence can be 
placed. 
 
(18) How is the sufficiency of implementation assured?  Sufficiency of requirements is not enough to ensure safety. 
Developers (and, if relevant, regulators) must know, to a sufficient level of confidence, that an implementation 
created to satisfy these requirements does so in such a way as to preserve the safety inherent in the requirements.  
This area also has been an active area of research for a long time, and will continue to be so. 
 
(19) How are assumptions and implications understood?  Recognizing that all requirements and implementations 
include certain assumptions, developers (and regulators, if relevant) need to know that these assumptions, and the 
implications of them, are sufficiently understood so that the operational use of the system conforms to them. 
 
(20) What level of confidence is provided by assessment methods and tools?  The answers to many of the 
foundational epistemic questions discussed so far will be obtained, at least in part, through the use of various 
methods and tools.  Thus, the level of confidence that can be attached to those answers will depend, at least in part, 
on the level of confidence that can be legitimately derived from the results obtained from these various methods and 
tools. For example, how does a formal proof of correctness of a model of a part of the system contribute to the level 
of confidence compared to extensive testing of a completed system?  Because other disciplines (such as science, 
law, and philosophy) confront a similar epistemic question, studying how those disciplines answer the question 
seems like a fruitful area of research (Haack, 2007; Holloway, 1995; Holloway, 2002; Toulmin, 2001; Toulmin, 
2003; Walton, 1997). 
 
(21) What is the appropriate level of confidence to be attached to the satisfaction of standards?  This is another 
question around which much current debate revolves.  Significant differences of opinion exist concerning the 
relative importance of controls on the process used to develop software, satisfaction of pre-determined standardized 
objectives for each software system, and the development of system-specific safety arguments (Australian 
Government, 2008a; Australian Government, 2008b; Ministry of Defence, 2007; RTCA/EUROCAE, 1992; 
Software Engineering Institute, 2002).   These differences suggest strongly that a general consensus will not be 
reached in the near future.  Thus, this question needs to be asked specifically for each new system.  An important 
related question that should also be asked is: ‘What precautions are necessary to ensure that evaluations of safety are 
not biased towards simply trying to convince a regulator that the system is safe enough to be deployed?’ 
 
As was true for the questions in the previous sections, some of the questions listed above have been considered in 
various ways (Brooks, 1987; Hawkins and Kelly, 2000; Jackson et al. 2007; Kelly, 1998; McDermid et al. 2005; 
Weaver, 2003), but no systematic, detailed research efforts exist for developing cogent, comprehensive answers to 
all of them, or for ensuring that all the relevant questions are enumerated. 
  
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
Although few system safety practitioners or researchers may be inclined to say it quite this way, system safety is 
primarily concerned with epistemic questions, that is, questions concerning knowledge and the degree of confidence 
that can be placed in that knowledge.  In a previous paper, we enumerated an initial set of foundational epistemic 
questions.  In this paper, we have refined those previously developed questions, discussed some difficulties that exist 
in answering the questions today, and speculated on possible research that may enable improved confidence in the 
accuracy of answers to the questions in the future. 
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Appendix 
 
The list below collects the foundational epistemic questions discussed in this paper in one place. 
 
Existing Systems: Accident-Independent 
(1) How is operational safety assessed?    
(2) How does operational safety compare with expected safety?     
(3) How should difference in safety assessments be reconciled?   
(4) How does the operational environment affect safety? 
(5) What maintenance is required for safety? 
(6) How do changes affect safety? 
 
Existing Systems: Accident-Related 
(7) What information is available to investigators?   
(8) How do investigators know all relevant factors have been found?  
(9) How can lessons taught by an accident improve safety?   
 
Future Systems: Replacements 
(10) What does ‘at least as safe as’ mean?   
(11) What are the safety implications during transition?   
 
Future Systems: Truly New 
(12) How is the desired level of safety to be determined?    
(13) What can be learned from existing systems?   
(14) How will novel technologies affect safety?    
 
Future Systems: Both Replacements and Truly New 
(15) What level of confidence in safety is required?   
(16) How is knowledge obtained about the intended operational environment?   
(17) How is the sufficiency of safety requirements assured?   
(18) How is the sufficiency of implementation assured?   
(19) How are assumptions and implications understood?   
(20) What level of confidence is provided by assessment methods and tools?   
(21) What is the appropriate level of confidence to be attached to the satisfaction of standards?    
 
